I n 2002 we published the article "The Russian Tax Reform", 1 in which we presented a fi rst evaluation of modern Russian tax policy and the tax reforms of 2000/01; now we are continuing in this vein and following up the topic of our paper by analysing, fi rst, the consequences of the previous tax reform for the Russian economy, second, different aspects of Russian fi scal competitiveness in comparison with its main rivals in the world economy (such as the other BRIC countries -Brazil, India and China -as well as the closest and biggest Russian neighbours from Eastern Europe -Poland and Ukraine) and third, the extent of any remaining shortcomings of the Russian tax system.
In this paper, the "competitiveness" of the tax system is understood as its attractiveness for capital (and, in the second place, highly skilled labour). Therefore, we try to measure (at least approximately) competitiveness in terms of, above all, international capital fl ows. Attractiveness, in turn, is assumed to be infl uenced (negatively) by the level of tax rates and (positively) by the predictability and lawfulness of tax administration. It follows that, ceteris paribus, lower tax rates or an improved tax administration should make a tax system more competitive and attract more capital. Admittedly, this is quite a simplistic view because the role of government expenses is completely neglected. It is possible, for example, that tax rates are too low to raise enough revenue to pay for important public goodsthe absence or poor quality of which might make the country in question a very unattractive place to invest in, the low tax rates notwithstanding. In the case of Russia, however, we may safely neglect this possibility: as long as the budget expands and still shows surpluses (see below), lower tax rates cannot be responsible for any problems with the supply of public goods and may therefore be interpreted as increasing the attractiveness of the tax system (and, thus, of the country itself).
The Growth of the Russian Economy and Its Causes
The last several years were very favourable for the development of the Russian economy: rates of GDP growth averaged 7% annually since the fi nancial crisis of 1998 (8.1% in 2007 2 ); at the beginning of 2008 currency reserves exceeded $475 billion 3 and the stabilisation fund contained more than $155 billion; 4 the federal budget has run surpluses since 2001 and ended 2007 with a surplus of 6% of GDP; 5 government debt has fallen to record lows; offi cial unemployment at the end of 2007 fell to 2%; 6 and the ruble has become one of the most stable currencies. Over the last six years, fi xed capital investments have averaged 2 http://www.cbr.ru/.
3 Ibid. 4 http://www1.minfi n.ru/ru/stabfund/statistics/volume/; on 1 February 2008 the Stabilisation Fund (almost $158 billion) was divided into two parts -the Reserve Fund ($126 billion) and the National Welfare Fund ($32 billion).
5 http://www.lenta.ru/news/2008/01/17/itog/.
6 http://www.lenta.ru/news/2007/12/06/unemployment/. Real unemployment is closer to 6% or 7%; people are offi cially counted as unemployed only if they apply for unemployment benefi ts.
real rates of return of more than 10% (in June 2008 the re-fi nancing rate of the Central Bank of Russia was 10.75%) and personal incomes have achieved a real growth of more than 12% per annum. 7 In 2006 Russia was ranked 11th in the world in terms of total GDP, and its per capita indicators were better than those of the other BRIC countries and the Ukraine (cf. Table 1 ).
Is this impressive development merely the consequence of favourable conditions on the international markets for raw materials (especially the high prices for crude oil and gas -the principal Russian export goods) or is it the achievement of the economic policy of President Vladimir Putin? It has to be admitted that the favourable economic situation was, to a considerable degree, due to the growth of oil and gas prices on the international markets. According to expert estimates, these commodities were the most important component of both the "stable" economic growth in Russia and the favorable situation of Russian public fi nances. Thus, in the decade of radical systematic economic transformation (1986) (1987) (1988) (1989) (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) , when oil prices were low, the average annual growth of the national economy was minus 8.5%. A decade later (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) , after strong oil price increases, the average growth rate of the Russian economy climbed to plus 5.4% and forecasts for 2006 -2010 made by the World Bank predict an average rate of growth of 6.3%. 8 The positive infl uence of 7 https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ rs.html.
8 http://devdata.worldbank.org/AAG/rus_aag.pdf. oil and gas prices on the surplus of the Russian federal budget is shown in Table 2 . We can see that without the growth of oil and gas export income the real balance of the Russian federal budget would have been negative.
9
Although high oil prices and a relatively cheap ruble initially drove Russian economic growth, since 2003 consumer demand and, more recently, investment have played a signifi cant role. Thus the medium and long-term effects of the structural economic reforms of the 1990s, such as privatisation and price, market and trade liberalisation, have made themselves felt. One important part of the reforms that has positively infl uenced the Russian economy was the tax reform initiated at the end of the 1990s.
10 Admittedly, it is diffi cult to pinpoint the extent of its infl uence but, as taxation is a very important determinant of international capital fl ows, the development of these fl ows seems to indicate that, in any case, the tax system has become more competitive.
9 Oil and gas related revenue is due not only to the tax on the extraction of natural resources but also to excises and VAT on the sales of oil and gas products in Russia and to the corporate profi t tax paid by the oil and gas industry. 10 Cf., e.g., A. P o g o r l e t s k i y, F. S ö l l n e r, op. cit.
Russia's Position in the International Capital Markets
Since 2006 the Russian Federation is a relatively desirable destination for foreign investments; so far, it has even been quite immune to the turbulences on world fi nancial markets in the wake of the US mortgage crisis of 2007/08. Figure 1 shows the positive dynamics of capital movements to and from Russia and illustrates the radical changes in this area since 2005.
The stable economic situation and especially the favourable development of the domestic market now attract more FDI to the Russian economy than in the 1990s and also allow Russian companies in different industries (such as Gazprom, Rusal, Krasair, VTB, Alfa, LSR and many others) to expand abroad by purchasing competitors or creating their own business units in foreign countries. 
An Outline of the Russian Tax System
The tax reform at the beginning of the 21st century was the fi rst step towards building a competitive tax system for the Russian Federation. During the tax reform process the following steps were made:
Increasing the fairness and neutrality of the tax sys-• tem by abolishing unjustifi able tax advantages and ineffective taxes (such as the sales tax and the road user's tax) by improving collection methods, and by 11 http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/global500/2007/countries/Russia.html.
introducing clear rules for tax base determination and tax administration;
reducing the overall tax burden for taxpayers • by evenly distributing the tax burden, decreasing the tax burden of the wage fund and lowering individual income and corporate profi t taxes (of course, it was the nominal tax burden that was reduced; the effective tax burden of some tax evaders who were targeted by a more effective tax administration may well have increased); tax system simplifi cation • by reducing the number of taxes and collection methods, and by simplifying and rationalising tax payment; bringing stability and predictability to the tax system • by abandoning the chaotic and unsystematic tax legislation of the Yeltsin era.
The reform was designed to rationalise the tax system by, for example, reducing the number of taxes, and to lower the corporate and individual tax burden. Changes to the tax regime that came into effect in January 2001 included the introduction of a fl at-rate personal income tax of 13% and the simplifi cation of social security taxation. The corporate tax rate was lowered from 35% to 24% at the start of 2002. The basic rate of value-added tax (VAT) was reduced from 20% to 18% at the start of 2004, and a regional 5% sales tax was abolished. Furthermore, tax administration has continuously been improved since the beginning of the new century (e.g., tax revenue in 2007 grew almost 30% year-on-year 12 ).
In the international context, Russia has more than 60 treaties on double taxation with almost all the major 12 http://www.nalog.ru/html/docs/pril_2007.xls. (Table 4 ) and the respective number in Table 3 ($29.9 billion) is due to fl uctuations in the dollar/ ruble exchange rate between summer 2007 (when the entries in Table  4 were calculated) and the end of 2007 (when the entries in Table 3 were calculated). 
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Intereconomics, September/October 2008 292 countries of the world. They make it suffi ciently easy to repatriate profi ts (especially dividends, interests and royalties) from Russia to other countries as well as to invest into the Russian economy through low-tax countries and international holding, fi nancial, licensing and service companies and banks. That is why more than 50% of FDI infl ow in 2006 came from Holland and Cyprus which both have favourable tax treaties with Russia; Switzerland, Luxembourg and the British Virgin Islands (popular locations of offshore companies used in international operations with Russia) also fi gure among the ten principal foreign investors (cf. Table  5 ).
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The reform of the Russian tax system was realised by taking into account the insights of modern public fi nance theory and the results of the neo-conservative tax reforms in the USA and UK as well as of the successful VAT implementation in Europe. Stimulating business by considerably reducing income and profi t taxes and shifting the tax burden to indirect taxes (VAT and the tax on the extraction of natural resources) were the specifi c traits of the Russian tax reform of the 2000s. It became the most coherent and effective reform of all the economic transformations pursued by president Vladimir Putin and his administration. As a result, Russia now has a quite modern and competitive tax system which strongly contributes to making Russia attractive to both domestic and foreign individuals and corporations.
The structure of tax revenues in the Russian federal budget in 2007 is shown in Figure 2. 14 We can see a proportion of 70:30 between indirect and direct taxes in the Russian federal tax system as well as the important roles of VAT (37%) and the tax on the extraction of natural resources (30%) as the principal sources of tax revenue for the central government. Such a tax structure may have been typical for developing countries with problems with the collection of direct taxes. However, it has also become more common in Europe: in the 2000s the share of indirect taxes (taxes on goods and services) in total tax revenue exceeded 30% in Holland, the United Kingdom, Finland, Denmark and Ireland. Moreover, in Ireland, whose tax system is one of the most competitive in Europe, the share of indirect taxes in total tax revenue even approached 50% (it was 46.6% in 2004) . 15 In France in 2007 indirect taxes (VAT plus internal tax on oil products) were responsible for 55.8% of total tax revenue. 16 It appears that Russian taxes are not too burdensome either for companies or for individuals, especially taking into consideration the VAT rate of only 18% in comparison with higher VAT rates in Austria, Germany, France, Sweden and Denmark.
Nevertheless budget dependence on oil and gas (revenue from the tax on the extraction of natural resources amounts to one third of the federal tax revenue) makes the cyclical factor in modern Russian fi scal policy quite important. Table 6 shows the considerable growth of the cyclical component of tax income, i.e. of that part of tax income which is due to favourable 14 The income tax does not appear in the graph because income tax revenue (the share of which in the consolidated budget of Russia is about 20%) goes only to state and muncipal entities, not to the federal government. conditions on global energy markets. 17 Under such circumstances one has to be concerned about the instability of the current federal budget structure. Moreover, the situation in 2006 was even worse than in 1998 when Russia suffered a serious fi nancial crisis provoked by the infl uence of external factors. Any price collapse on the international raw materials markets can cause a drastic decrease in tax collections because, nowadays, the cyclical component of tax income is equal to about one third of total tax income (7% of GDP). Therefore, the budget is very exposed to destabilising external shocks.
Russia and International Tax Competition
When one looks at Russian competitiveness in the world economy, it becomes clear that the global competitiveness rating of the country is not particularly high. According to evaluations of the World Economic Forum for 2007-2008, the Russian Federation occupies the 58th place among 131 nations (behind China, India and Poland but before Brazil and Ukraine) -which is due to problems like corruption, excessive bureaucracy and (outside the major cities) poor infrastructure. In the fi eld of taxation the Russian position is even worse: ranks 97 and 90 with regard to "extent and effect of taxation" and "total tax rate" respective- 17 In Table 6 , the "cyclical component" is defi ned as the difference between actual tax income and the hypothetical tax income that would result if the "normal" price of Urals oil (assumed to be $27 per barrel) were realised; thus, a positive (negative) cyclical component refl ects particularly high (low) prices.
ly.
18 This is quite astonishing in the light of the Russian tax reform and can only be accounted for by the persistent gap between the (good) tax laws and their (bad) execution by the administration (see below). At least in comparison with its international rivals Russia's position looks a lot better: India, China, Brazil, Poland and Ukraine have either a higher tax-to-GDP ratio or higher tax rates or both (cf. Table 7 ). Besides, complaints by Russian businessmen about taxation as one of the most problematical factors for doing business are quite muted compared to the same complaints in other countries such as the USA, Germany, Japan, United Kingdom, Poland, Brazil and Ukraine.
Comparing present Russian positions in international tax competition with other (big) emerging countries such as Brazil, India, China, Poland and Ukraine (cf . Table 8 ) we can also see some advantages of the modern Russian tax system in aspects such as the fi scal freedom index and overall tax burden. While the tax burden level in Russia (36.6% of GDP in 2007) was the highest among the above-mentioned countries, this rate is comparable with that of the United Kingdom (36.0%) and even lower than in some busi- 18 It should be pointed out that the WEF rankings are not unproblematical: the General Competitive Index (GCI) is calculated as a weighted average of the values of twelve "pillars of competiveness" (e.g. institutions, infrastructure, market size, business sophistication). All in all, 113 variables are used to calculate the GCI and its sub-indices -of which only 34 are "hard" data (such as the infl ation rate or the ratio of tax revenue to GDP) and 79 are derived from the Executive Opinion Surveys which the WEF conducts annually. Of course, both the subjective nature of the latter 79 variables and the (unavoidable) arbitrariness involved in determining the weights of the twelve "pillars" make it necessary to exercise some caution when interpreting the GCI results. ness-friendly countries of the European Union such as Luxembourg (37.8%), Holland (37.5%), Austria (42.6%) and Belgium (45.0%). 19 It is necessary to add that before the tax reform of the 2000s the tax burden level in Russia was more than 40% of GDP. The fi scal position of the Russian Federation is also preferable in terms of different tax rate levels, especially those of individual income taxation, where Russia was the fi rst among the above-mentioned group of countries to introduce a fl at rate of only 13%. (This decision by the Russian authorities was the most important component of the tax reform.) Even Ukraine has copied this Russian example in its present tax policy. The rates of corporate taxation in Russia (20% to 24%, depending on the location of business) also are quite competitive in comparison with Brazil (overall tax rate in the country is 34%), India (33%), China (33%), Ukraine (25%) and Poland (19%). 20 The Index of Economic Freedom is the average of ten sub-indices such as "business freedom", "trade freedom" and "fi scal freedom" (with the latter depending on the level of tax rates and tax revenues as a percentage of GDP); it is expressed in per cent (with 100% indicating total freedom); http://www.heritage.org/research/features/index/ countries.cfm.
fi scal freedom index is the highest among those countries and in this fi eld Russia achieved its best results in the investigation. Even under the conditions of Putin's "sovereign democracy", characterised by strong government infl uence on private business, taxation remained the one fi eld not subject to the repressive control of Putin's administration. Indeed the Russian tax legislation prepared by the team led by Deputy Minister of Finance Sergey Shatalov is one of the most liberal, modern and well-made in Europe. The same is defi nitely not true of the administration of those tax laws, which continues to be haunted by corruption, ineffi ciency and political interference. In particular, the Russian government from time to time uses the tax law to crush political opponents -most prominently in the case of Mikhail Khodorkovkiy and Platon Lebedev (who were imprisoned and whose oil company, Yukos, was bankrupted by Putin's administration on accusations of, inter alia, tax fraud). Ukraine. So, despite some troubles and problems with tax administration, the country is competitive in the fi scal area, not only relative to its direct rivals but also relative to many developed countries. Indeed, living and working in Russia now, especially in the big cities (such as Moscow -the city with the highest incomes and living standards in Russia, and with the most billionaires worldwide -or St. Petersburg, Ekaterinburg, Nijniy Novgorod, Novosibirsk, Krasnoyarsk) and being a Russian tax resident is quite popular among many Western businessmen and creative people who take into consideration good business perspectives and low levels of individual income taxation.
Nevertheless, in order to defend and even improve its present position in international tax competition Russia needs to further modify the tax system, adapting to new global challenges.
Further Modifi cations of the Tax System
According to the offi cial positions of the Russian authorities, the tax reform of the 2000s has been all but completed and there are no plans for reforms that would affect the structure of the tax system.
22 Instead, the current tax policy in the Russian Federation aims at improving the present system of taxation by, in particular, removing any remaining inconsistencies. Thus, it is intended to:
improve the quality of the national tax administra-• tion (improving relations between taxpayers and tax authorities; controlling transfer pricing between domestic and foreign companies controlled by Russian residents; defi ning tax residency for juridical persons);
increase the effectiveness and neutrality of the main • taxes (correcting taxable income for general income growth and infl ation, lowering of basic tax rates, changing the unifi ed social security tax, introducing a real estate tax);
integrate the Russian tax system into the global tax • system (signing new treaties on double taxation, fi ghting international tax evasion and tax avoidance).
We shall consider the most important changes in Russian taxation planned for the near future. All of them are quite progressive and refl ect the best international practice of taxation. Doubtlessly, these modifi cations of the Russian tax legislation will strengthen the country's position in international tax competition -if they can be realised as intended.
Tax residency of juridical persons.
• The current Russian tax legislation (the Tax Code of the Russian Federation) does not include the category "tax residency of juridical persons". 23 Due to this defect of the Tax Code, it is uncertain under what circumstances tax treaties to prevent double taxation are to be applied to a "Russian organisation" with its headquarters (place of effective management) in, e.g., Switzerland or Cyprus. Also, it allows Russian businessmen to use the various possibilities of international tax planning to transfer incomes from Russia to low tax jurisdictions because the real "residence" of a Russian business unit managed de jure from abroad is often inconsequential. To prevent this abuse the Russian authorities are about to introduce the category "juridical person -tax resident of the Russian Federation". It is intended to rely on such criteria of company residence as place of effective management and place of residence of controlling owners. This is intended to help the Russian tax authorities to tax the global profi t of companies registered outside the Russian Federation but managed from Russia and belonging to individuals who are tax residents of the country.
Controlling transfer pricing.
• Articles 20 and 40 of the Tax Code already contain measures to prevent the abuse of transfer pricing to avoid Russian taxes. Nevertheless, the Russian authorities intend to restrict transfer pricing in the tax planning activities of related companies by abolishing Arts. 20 and 40 which are to be replaced by a new Section V 1 of the Tax Code ("Interdependent persons. General provisions on prices for purposes of taxation. Controlling transactions.") 24 First of all, the method of defi ning related business units will be changed (taking into account the real relations between participants of transactions instead of the current practice according to Art. 20). It is also intended to introduce the categories "identical" and "homogeneous good" into current Art. 38 to make the determination of the objects of taxation easier. In addition, methods of calculation of arm's length price corresponding to the Western practice (comparable prices method, resale prices method, cost-plus method) will be mandated. In addition, the interval of the permissible deviation of transfer prices from market prices will be changed. Instead of the current interval of ±20% (according to Art. 40) Finally, one more innovation of Russian transfer pricing regulation is the possibility of concluding advanced price agreements (APAs) between taxpayers and tax authorities. This practice -which exists, in particular, in the USA -allows taxpayers to minimise risks due to the evaluation (and possible modifi cation) of transfer price transactions by the tax service -even if these transactions completely respect the letter of the law. APA is a quite radical proposal for the Russian authorities which refl ects their interest in achieving compromises and understanding with taxpayers.
Introduction of CFC rule.
• The CFC (controlled foreign company) rule is also one of the innovations of the Russian authorities. Many Russian businessmen are controlling shareholders or owners of foreign companies and many of them are incorporated exclusively for tax purposes in low tax jurisdictions (like Cyprus, British Virgin Islands, Switzerland and so on). To prevent this practice, which is harmful to the national budget, the Russian authorities intend to introduce as of 1 January 2009 a CFC rule 25 equivalent to that already in use in about 30 major countries including the USA, the United Kingdom, Germany, France and Japan. After implementation of the CFC rule Russia will begin to tax the profi ts of a number of offshore companies belonging to national residents.
Taxation of dividends
• . Since the beginning of 2008 the dividend taxation regime has become more favourable for both Russian and foreign investors. Instead of the previous withholding rate of 9%, dividends paid to Russian corporations controlling at least 50% of the dividend paying company are now taxed at the rate of zero. The 9% rate continues to be applied to the dividend income of Russian individuals or corporations holding less than 50% of the dividend paying company. For dividends distributed to foreign individuals the withholding tax rate has been lowered from 30% to 15% -the same rate foreign corporations already had to pay.
26 These measures stimulate the investment in Russian equity by both domestic and foreign investors. Moreover, the withholding tax on dividends for foreign individuals can be reduced from 15% to 5% or 10% according to various treaties on double taxation.
Value added tax.
• Recently, plans were unveiled by Putin and his successor, Medvedev, to lower the standard rate of VAT from 18% to, eventually, 10% (the current reduced rate applicable to certain food products).
Unifi ed social security tax.
• This tax, introduced by the tax reform of the 2000s, is now under radical revision. There are several plans to transform the structure of this tax and to reduce its rates because of the crisis of the Russian old-age pension system. According to recent proposals by the Ministry of Health and Social Development only two tax rates (26% for annual wages of up to 600,000 rubles and 0% for those exceeding this limit) will remain to be applied to the wage fund.
27 In any case, the level of social security taxation in Russia is not as burdensome as in some European countries (such as Germany or France), which makes the Russian Federation more competitive in terms of effective wages for some high-skill jobs (software production, manufacturing, R&D). Many leading foreign companies such as IBM, LG, ABB, BMW and others are making use of this tax advantage.
Real estate tax.
• The current Russian tax legislation does not provide for taxation of the property of individuals. According to government proposals a real estate tax for individuals is to be introduced in the period of 2009-2010. This tax will -like an existing property tax for corporations -be a municipal one.
28
International tax relations.
• In the international sphere the Russian tax authorities will continue cooperation with foreign tax administrations using the current network of double taxation treaties as well as signing new ones to expand the possibilities for exchanging fi scal information in order to prevent tax fraud by 26 Ibid., p. 41. Russian residents. A priority for Russian tax policy is the fi ght against tax havens. In December 2007 the Ministry of Justice approved a list of offshore jurisdictions prepared by the Ministry of Finance. 29 The main criteria for a country or a territory to be classifi ed as an offshore jurisdiction are the absence of information exchange with Russia on fi scal affairs or a low level of corporate profi t taxation (less than 2/3 of the basic Russian tax rate of 24%). Russian residents doing business with or in countries from that "black list" incur the risk of being audited by the tax authorities with regard to the CFC rule or transfer pricing. Also, Russia intends to conclude double taxation treaties with those jurisdictions on the list for which no such agreements exist at the moment (such as Malta or the United Arab Emirates; Russia already has treaties with, e.g., Cyprus and Malaysia).
Still Anything Left to Be Desired?
In our previous paper we emphasised the need for further reform. 30 Let us see whether the problems we mentioned have been taken care of by now.
As regards personal income taxation, dividends and • interest income are still taxed at special rates (9% and 15/20% respectively, vs. the regular 13% rate). Furthermore, there is still the 35% rate on "excessive" interest. Thus the principle of horizontal equity is still violated -although it has to be admitted that the tax differential has been narrowed considerably.
There is still a difference between the rates of profi t • tax (20-24%) and income tax (13%) so that profi t taxation discriminates between the profi ts of corporations and of individual entrepreneurs.
Taxation still distorts the decision of companies be-• tween accumulating and distributing profi ts -but the distortion now runs the other way: distributed profi ts (dividends) are taxed lower (9% withholding tax, whether they are received by individuals or other companies) than retained profi ts (20-24% profi t tax).
The standard rate of VAT has been lowered -from • 20% to 18%, a rate that now looks almost low in the face of VAT increases in other countries. 29 The complete list of low tax countries and non-cooperative jurisdictions includes Andorra, Anjouan (Comoros), Anguilla, Antigua 30 A. P o g o r l e t s k i y, F. S ö l l n e r, op. cit.
The tax system has been further simplifi ed and tax • administration has been improved, albeit it is still far from perfect (in particular as regards political interference).
The overall result is mixed: undeniable progress but still room for further improvements.
Conclusion
Russia has a modern and effi cient system of taxation with low tax rates as well as a good quality of tax administration. Thus the tax reform of the 2000s created strong competitive advantages for the current Russian tax system, which is simpler, more transparent and better managed than fi scal systems in countries such as Brazil, India, China, Poland and Ukraine (which, in some way or other, can be regarded as direct competitors of Russia). But Russia also appears to be competitive in the tax fi eld in comparison with major industrial countries. This favourable development will be continued with the introduction of the CFC rule, transfer pricing control and tax haven regulationsnecessary elements of a fair tax competition. As far as the tax laws are concerned, there may still be some changes which one would like to see being made, but they appear almost negligible in comparison with what has been achieved.
In theory, thus, things in the fi eld of taxation are looking just fi ne. However, there are two caveats. First, due to the heavy reliance of the Russian budget on gas and oil related taxes, the favourable situation may deteriorate quickly if energy prices start to fall. Second, the current policy of the tax administration seems to be somewhat arbitrary (to put it mildly). Obviously, tax laws are often used as an instrument to fi ght political opponents of the Kremlin. Thus, it has only been imperfectly possible to separate the economic and the political sphere, to pursue a liberal policy in the former and a repressive one in the latter. In particular, there is considerable confl ict in the fi eld of taxation where the demands of the rule of law and of economic rationality are sometimes sacrifi ced to political expediency. In this way, Putin's "sovereign democracy" may well have prevented Russia from reaping the gains of its impressive tax reforms -by introducing political risks into the fi eld of taxation.
With Putin's successor, Medvedev, now in offi ce things may hopefully start to change for the better. In many public statements the new President has emphasised the need to fi ght corruption, to rein in the bureaucracy and to uphold the rule of law. It remains to be seen whether this liberal rhetoric is followed by equally liberal action.
